SIBRA: Scalable Internet Bandwidth Reservation Architecture by Basescu, Cristina et al.
SIBRA: Scalable Internet Bandwidth Reservation Architecture
Cristina Basescu∗, Raphael M. Reischuk∗, Pawel Szalachowski∗, Adrian Perrig∗,
Yao Zhang†, Hsu-Chun Hsiao‡, Ayumu Kubota§, Jumpei Urakawa§
∗ETH Zurich, Switzerland
†Beihang University, China
‡National Taiwan University, Taiwan
§KDDI R&D Laboratories Inc., Japan
Abstract—This paper proposes a Scalable Internet Bandwidth
Reservation Architecture (SIBRA) as a new approach against
DDoS attacks, which, until now, continue to be a menace on
today’s Internet. SIBRA provides scalable inter-domain resource
allocations and botnet-size independence, an important property to
realize why previous defense approaches are insufficient. Botnet-
size independence enables two end hosts to set up communication
regardless of the size of distributed botnets in any Autonomous
System in the Internet. SIBRA thus ends the arms race between
DDoS attackers and defenders. Furthermore, SIBRA is based on
purely stateless operations for reservation renewal, flow monitor-
ing, and policing, resulting in highly efficient router operation,
which is demonstrated with a full implementation. Finally, SIBRA
supports Dynamic Interdomain Leased Lines (DILLs), offering
new business opportunities for ISPs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent extensive discussion among network administrators
on the NANOG mailing list [4] pointedly reflects the current
state of DDoS attacks and the trickiness of suitable defenses:
defenses typically perform traffic scrubbing in ISPs or in the
cloud, but attacks often surpassing 20–40 Gbps overwhelm
the upstream link bandwidth and cause congestion that traffic
scrubbing cannot handle. As attacks of up to 400 Gbps have
recently been observed [5], no vital solution seems to be on the
horizon that can defend the network against such large-scale
flooding attacks.
Quality of service (QoS) architectures at different granu-
larities, such as IntServ [42] and DiffServ [20], fail to provide
end-to-end traffic guarantees at Internet scale: with billions
of flows through the network core, routers cannot handle the
per-flow state required by IntServ, whereas the behavior of
DiffServ’s traffic classification across different domains cannot
guarantee consistent end-to-end connectivity.
Network capabilities [7, 24, 30, 44, 46] are not effective
against attacks such as Coremelt [38] that build on legitimate
low-bandwidth flows to swamp core network links. FLoc [24]
in particular considers bot-contaminated domains, but it is
ineffective in case of dispersed botnets.
Fair resource reservation mechanisms (per source [29], per
destination [46], per flow [12, 42, 44], per computation [32],
and per class [20]) are necessary to resolve link-flooding
attacks, but are not sufficient: none of them provides botnet-
size independence, a critical property for viable DDoS defense.
Botnet-size independence is the property in which a legit-
imate flow’s allocated bandwidth does not diminish below the
minimum allocation when the number of bots (even in other
ASes in the world) increases. Per-flow and per-computation
resource allocation, for instance, will reduce their allocated
bandwidth towards 0 when the number of bots that share the
corresponding resources increases.
To illustrate the importance of botnet-size independence,
we observe how previous systems suffer from the tragedy of
the network-link commons, which refers to the problem that
the allocation of a shared resource will diminish toward an
infinitesimally small allocation when many entities have the
incentive to increase their “fair share”.1 In particular, per-flow
fair sharing allocations (including per-class categorization of
flows) suffer from this fate, as each source has an incentive
to increase its share by simply creating more flows. However,
even when the fair sharing system is not abused, the resulting
allocations are too small to be useful. To explain in more detail,
denoting N as the number of end hosts in the Internet, per-
source or per-destination schemes could ideally conduct fair
sharing of O(1/N) based on all potential sources or desti-
nations that traverse a given link. However, with increasing
hop-count distance of the link from the source or to the
destination, the number of potential sources or destinations that
traverse that link increases exponentially. Per-flow reservation
performs even more poorly, allocating a bandwidth slice of
only O(1/M2) in the case of a Coremelt attack [38] between
M bots, and only O(1/M∗P) during a Crossfire attack [21] with
P destination servers that can be contacted. In the presence of
billions of end hosts engaged in end-to-end communication,
the allocated bandwidth becomes too small to be useful.
In this paper, we propose a Scalable Internet Bandwidth
Reservation Architecture (SIBRA), a novel bandwidth allo-
cation system that operates at Internet-scale and resolves the
drawbacks of prior systems. In a nutshell, SIBRA provides in-
terdomain bandwidth allocations, which enable construction of
Dynamic Interdomain Leased Lines (DILLs), in turn enabling
new ISP business models. SIBRA’s bandwidth reservations
guarantee a minimal amount of bandwidth to each pair of end
hosts by limiting the possible paths in end-to-end communica-
1We use this term following Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons
[17], which according to the author has no technical solution, but instead
“requires a fundamental extension in morality”. As we should not expect
attackers to show any of the latter, we believe in a technical solution —
at least for the Internet!
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tion. An important property of SIBRA is its per-flow stateless
operation for reservation renewal, monitoring, and policing,
which results in scalable and efficient router operation. SIBRA
is fully implemented; our evaluation demonstrates its effective-
ness.
II. GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND THE ADVERSARY
The goal of this paper is to defend against link-flooding
attacks, in which distributed attackers collude by sending
traffic to each other (Coremelt [38]) or to publicly accessible
servers (Crossfire [21]) in order to exhaust the bandwidth of
targeted servers and Internet backbone links. In the case of
Coremelt, the traffic volume might not be limited (e.g., by
TCP congestion control) since all participating hosts are under
adversarial control and can thus run any protocol. In the case
of Crossfire, distributed attackers collude by sending traffic
to legitimate hosts in order to cut off network connections to
selected servers. We note that other known attacks constitute
a combination of the two cases above.
Adversary model. We assume that ASes may be malicious
and misbehave by sending large amounts of traffic (bandwidth
requests and data packets). We furthermore assume any AS
in the world can contain malicious end hosts (e.g., as parts
of larger botnets). In particular, there is no constraint on
the distribution of compromised end hosts. However, attacks
launched by routers (located inside ASes) that intentionally
modify, delay, or drop traffic (beyond the natural drop rate)
are out of the scope of this paper.
Desired properties. Under the defined adversary model,
we postulate the following properties a link-flooding-resilient
bandwidth reservation mechanism should satisfy:
• Botnet-size independence. The minimum amount of
guaranteed bandwidth per end host does not diminish with
an increasing number of bots.
• Per-flow stateless operation. The mechanism’s overhead
on routers should be negligible. In particular, backbone
routers should not require per-flow, per-source, or per-
destination state in the fastpath, which could lead to state
exhaustion attacks.2 Our analysis of real packet traces on
core links supports this property (Section VIII-B).
• Scalability. The costs and overhead of the system should
scale to the size of the Internet, including management
and setup, AS contracts, router and end host computation
and memory, as well as communication bandwidth.
Network assumptions. To achieve the properties we seek,
we assume (i) a network architecture that provides source-
controllable network paths, and (ii) hierarchical bandwidth
decomposition.
Concerning the first assumption of source-controllable net-
work paths, we assume that routing paths (i.e., sequences of
AS hops) are selected from several options by bandwidth-
requesting sources (who then negotiate bandwidth with the
destination and the intermediate AS hops). There are mul-
tiple routing protocols that provide such features: Pathlet
routing [15], NIRA [45], and SCION [9, 48], where the
2A router’s fastpath handles packet processing and forwarding on the
line card, and is thus performance-critical. Routing protocols, network man-
agement, and flow setup are handled by the slowpath, which typically executes
on the main router CPU and is thus less performance-critical.
source can specify a path in the packet headers, or I3 [36]
and Platypus [33], where the source specifies a sequence of
forwarding nodes. We note that this first assumption may be
of independent interest for ISPs since they may financially
benefit [23].
Our second assumption of bandwidth decomposition is
satisfied through a concept of domain isolation. To this end,
we leverage SCION’s isolation concept [9, 48] by grouping
ASes into independent Isolation Domains (ISDs), each with an
isolated control plane. Figure 1 depicts an example of 4 ISDs.
The two end hosts S and D in different ISDs are connected by
stitching three types of path segments together: an up-segment
from S to its ISD core, a core-segment within the Internet core
(from source ISD to destination ISD), and a down-segment
from D’s ISD core to end host D. The ISD core refers to
a set of top-tier ASes, the core ASes, that manage the ISD
(depicted with a dark background in Figure 1). Intuitively,
the isolation property yields that ASes inside an ISD can
establish paths with bandwidth guarantees to the ISD core —
independently of bandwidth reservations in other ISDs. The
bandwidth reservations for paths across ISDs will then be
based on the reservations inside the ISDs, but will be lower-
and upper-bounded for each end host. In particular, malicious
entities will not be able to congest the network.
Furthermore, we assume that each end-to-end flow from
S to D can be assigned a unique, non-hijackable flow identi-
fier [6, 18, 28]; that ASes locally allocate resources to their
internal end hosts; and that network links can fail and exhibit
natural packet loss, which could lead to dropped reservation
requests or dropped data packets.
III. SIBRA DESIGN
This section describes the design of SIBRA, in particular
bandwidth reservations and their enforcement. After a brief
overview, we describe SIBRA’s reservation types in detail.
A. SIBRA overview
A key insight of SIBRA is its hierarchical decomposition of
the bandwidth allocation problem to make management and
configuration scale to the size of the Internet. More specifically,
SIBRA makes use of (1) core contracts: long-term contracts
amongst the core ASes of large-scale isolation domains (ISDs),
(2) steady contracts: intermediate-term contracts amongst
ASes within an ISD, and (3) ephemeral contracts: short-term
contracts for end-to-end communication that leverage the long-
term and intermediate-term contracts.
Thanks to this three-layer decomposition, on the order of
100 large-scale ISDs (e.g., composed by sets of countries
or groups of companies) can scalably establish long-term
core paths with guaranteed bandwidth between each other
(the double continuous lines in Figure 1). Within each ISD,
providers sell bandwidth to their customers, and customers
can establish intermediate-term reservations for specific intra-
ISD paths, which we call steady paths (the dashed lines
in Figure 1). Steady paths are mostly used for connection
setup traffic, but can also be used for low-bandwidth data
traffic. Finally, core and steady paths in conjunction enable
the creation of short-term end-to-end reservations across ISDs,
which we call ephemeral paths (the solid green lines in
Figure 1). Ephemeral paths, in contrast to steady paths, are
used for the transmission of high-throughput data traffic.
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Fig. 1: Exemplary SIBRA topology with 4 isolation domains and their
ASes (the core ASes are filled). The ephemeral path (green) from end
host S to end host D is created along a steady up-path, a core path,
and a steady down-path. The attack traffic (red) does not diminish
the reserved bandwidth on ephemeral paths.
SIBRA paths are established over SIBRA links whose
anatomy is depicted in Figure 2: 80% of the bandwidth of
each SIBRA link is allocated for ephemeral traffic, 5% for
steady traffic, and the remaining 15% for best-effort traffic.
These proportions are flexible system parameters; we discuss
the current choice in Section VIII-A. Note that the proportion
for steady and ephemeral traffic constitutes an upper bound:
in case the ephemeral bandwidth is not fully utilized, it is
allocated to best-effort traffic (Section III-D).
An important feature of SIBRA is that steady paths, besides
carrying the 5% control traffic of links inside an ISD, also
limit the bandwidth for ephemeral paths: An ephemeral path
is created by launching a request through existing steady
paths whose amounts of bandwidth determine – up to a fixed
scaling factor – the bandwidth of the requested ephemeral
path. More precisely, an ephemeral path is created through
the combination of (i) a steady up-path in the source ISD, (ii)
the steady part of a core path, and (iii) a steady down-path
in the destination ISD.3 The ephemeral path request uses only
the steady portion of a link (the blue part in Figure 2); the
actual ephemeral path traffic uses only the ephemeral portion
of a link (the orange part in Figure 2). In other words, the
more steady bandwidth a customer purchases locally within
her ISD, the larger the fraction of ephemeral bandwidth she
obtains to any other ISD in the Internet.
Based on these ideas, it becomes intuitively clear how
botnet-size independence is achieved and how the tragedy of
the network-link commons is resolved: Each pair of domains
can obtain a minimum bandwidth allocation, based on their
respective steady paths and based on the core contract. Thus,
a botnet cannot influence the minimum allocation, no matter
its size and distribution. A bot can only use up the bandwidth
allocated to the AS it resides in, but not lower the minimum
allocation of any other AS. It is thus in the responsibility of
3For instance, Figure 1 shows an ephemeral path from host S in ASE to
host D in ASH . If the source and destination are in the same ISD, then the
core path may not be necessary, e.g., the ephemeral path inside the US ISD.
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Fig. 2: The anatomy of SIBRA links: 80% of the link bandwidth is
used for ephemeral traffic, 5% for steady traffic, and 15% for best-
effort traffic. The core path from ASD1 to ASB2 comprises steady and
ephemeral traffic, but excludes best-effort traffic.
an AS to manage its allocations, and thereby to prevent bots
from obtaining resources of others within that AS.
In case an AS is dissatisfied with its minimum allocation,
it can purchase more bandwidth for its steady paths, as well
as request its core AS to purchase a larger allocation for the
core contract, which the AS would likely need to pay for. An
important point of these contracts is that, in order to scale, core
contracts are purely neighbor-based: only neighboring ASes
perform negotiations.
SIBRA’s scalability is additionally based on a relatively
low number of ephemeral paths, compared to all possible
end-to-end paths in today’s Internet, considered for instance
by IntServ [42]. As mentioned above, an ephemeral path in
SIBRA is fully determined by choosing two steady paths and
a core path. The number of steady up-/down-paths an AS
can simultaneously have is upper-bounded by a small SIBRA
system parameter (e.g., 5 to 7), and the number of core paths
is naturally upper-bounded by the number of ISDs.
To make SIBRA viable for practical applications, we need
to ensure that all aspects of the system are scalable and
efficient, which holds in particular for the frequent operations
such as flow admission, reservation renewal, and monitoring
and policing. For instance, all fastpath operations are per-flow
stateless to avoid state-exhaustion attacks and to simplify the
router architecture.
B. Core paths
Directly-connected core ASes (i.e., Tier-1 ISPs) are expected
to agree on a guaranteed amount of bandwidth for traffic
traversing their connecting links. We envision that ASes ratify
such core contracts on mutual business advantages for their
customers, on top of currently negotiated customer-to-provider
or peering relations. Similar to SLAs, core contracts are long
term (e.g., on the order of months) and can have an up-time
associated (e.g., the bandwidth is guaranteed 99.99% of the
time). Core contracts comprise steady and ephemeral traffic,
as illustrated in the shaded part of Figure 2. If one of the ASes
sends more traffic than agreed on, the AS is held accountable,
according to the established contract.
Core contracts are initiated by receiver core ASes: each
core AS observes the historical traffic values received on its
neighboring links, and proposes in the core contracts similar
values for the traffic the AS is willing to absorb. For instance,
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Fig. 3: Core contracts between core ASes (ASD1, ASD1a, ASB1, ASB2).
Destination Path Bandwidth
ASB2 ASB1→ ASB2 1 Tbps
ASB2 ASD1a→ ASB1→ ASB2 2 Tbps...
...
...
Fig. 4: Core contracts table at ASD1. Two core paths lead to ASB2.
in Figure 3, ASB2 proposes to absorb 5 Tbps of steady and
ephemeral traffic from ASB1 (Step ¬), and ASB1 accepts. The
contract is followed as long as ASB1 sends at most 5 Tbps
to ASB2, regardless of whether ASB1 is the actual origin of
the traffic, or ASB1 only forwards someone else’s traffic to
ASB2. For instance, ASB1 could forward traffic from ASD1
and ASD1a to ASB2. In the example, ASB1 offers to forward
1 Tbps from ASD1 (Step ­), and 3 Tbps from ASD1a (Step ®).
ASD1a extends the latter contract by proposing to ASD1 to
absorb 2 Tbps towards ASB2 (Step ¯). After completion of
the negotiation, ASD1 obtains guaranteed bandwidth to ASB2
along two core paths.
Figure 4 illustrates a local guaranteed-bandwidth table
that stores such core paths for ASD1. The table resembles a
forwarding table and may contain multiple entries for each
destination core AS, one entry for each core path. It results
from the contract proposals and the received acknowledgments
for a specific destination, ASB2 in this case. For brevity’s sake,
Figure 4 shows only the entries for destination ASB2.
The bandwidth of a core path reflects the overall traffic
volume exchanged between the source and the destination
ASes. To bootstrap the process, each participating AS observes
aggregate traffic volumes on its neighboring links, and initiates
contracts with a bandwidth of 85% of the observed aggregate
volume (5% steady + 80% ephemeral). The initially estimated
contracts are refined as dictated by the customer requirements
and payments (explained below).
Scalability. The core contract proposals traverse only one link
before being accepted or denied. For instance, in Figure 3,
ASB1 first accepts ASB2’s proposal (Step ¬), and only after-
wards, it submits its offers (Steps ­ and ®). Achieving global
consensus through immediate agreements is possible due to
the destination-initiated process of establishing core contracts,
in which the supported amount of traffic is already specified
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Fig. 5: Transit ASF processing reservation requests for sources S1,
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and can thus be decided based on local knowledge. In contrast,
source-initiated requests would require a distributed consensus
algorithm that would traverse all ASes whose agreement
is required. SIBRA’s design decision sacrifices such costly
interactions for better scalability, achieving a core contract
design that is scalable with the number of core ASes.
Payment. Core paths not only guarantee bandwidth between
ISDs, they also regulate the traffic-related money flow between
core ASes according to existing provider-to-customer (p2c) or
peering (p2p) relationships (e.g., c2p between ASB2 and ASB1,
and p2p between ASD1 and ASB1).
Similar to today’s state of affairs, we believe that market
forces create a convergence of allocations and prices when
ASes balance the bandwidth between their peers and adjust the
contracts such that the direct core AS neighbors are satisfied.
The neighbors, in turn, recursively adapt their contracts to
satisfy the bandwidth requirements of their customers. Paying
customers thus indirectly dictate to core ASes the destination
ISDs of core paths and the specified bandwidth in the contracts.
C. Steady paths
Steady paths are intermediate-term, low-bandwidth reserva-
tions that are established by ASes for guaranteed communi-
cation availability within an ISD. We envision that the default
validity of steady paths is on the order of minutes, but it can
periodically be extended. An endpoint AS can voluntarily tear
down its steady path before expiration and set up a new steady
path. For example, in Figure 1, ASE sets up a steady path to
ASA2, and ASH requests bandwidth guarantees from ASB2. As
mentioned earlier, SIBRA uses steady paths for two purposes:
(1) as communication guarantees for low-bandwidth traffic,
and (2) as building block for ephemeral paths: to guarantee
availability during connection setup and to perform weighted
bandwidth reservations (Section III-D).
Reservation request. SIBRA leverages so-called SCION rout-
ing beacons [9] that disseminate top-down from the ISD core
to the ASes. On their journey down, they collect AS-level path
information as well as information about the current amount
of available bandwidth (both steady and ephemeral) for each
link. When a leaf AS receives such a routing beacon with
information about a path segment, the AS can decide to submit
4We use the term destination in the following (and also in Figure 5) to stay
as general as possible. For steady-path reservation requests, the destination is
the ISD core; for ephemeral-path reservation requests, the destination will be
another end host (Section III-D).
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a reservation request that promotes the path segment to a
steady path. In this case, the leaf AS (e.g., ASE in Figure 1,
or S3 in Figure 5) computes a new flow ID, chooses the
amount of bandwidth and the expiration time, and sends a
steady path reservation message up the path to the core. The
requested amount of bandwidth can be chosen from a number
of predefined bandwidth classes, introduced for monitoring
optimization purposes (Section III-E).
Each intermediate AS on the path to the core performs
admission control by verifying the availability of steady band-
width to its neighbors on the path (Step I in Figure 5). Given
the fact that inbound traffic from multiple ingress routers
may converge at a single egress router, admission control
is performed at both ingress and egress routers. Specifically,
the ingress router of ASi checks the availability of steady
bandwidth on the link ASi−1 → ASi, and the egress router
of ASi on the link ASi → ASi+1. If enough bandwidth is
available at both the ingress and the egress router (Case Ê
in Figure 5), both routers temporarily reserve the requested
bandwidth (Step II). Subsequently, the egress router of ASi
issues a cryptographically authenticated reservation token (RT)
encoding the positive admission decision (Step III).
An RT generated by ASi is authenticated using a crypto-
graphic key Ki known only to ASi, by which ASi can later
verify if an RT embedded in the data packet is authentic.
More specifically, the RT contains the authenticated ingress
and the egress interfaces of ASi, and the reservation request
information. RTs are onion-authenticated to prevent an attacker
from crafting a steady path from RT chunks:
RTASi = ingressASi ‖ egressASi ‖
MACKi
(
ingressASi ‖ egressASi ‖ Request ‖ RTASi−1
)
where Request is defined as Bwreq ‖ ExpTime ‖ flowID. We
emphasize that steady path reservation flow identifiers are
independent of TCP flow identifiers: A steady path can carry
packets from multiple TCP flows, as long as these packets
contain the RTs corresponding to the steady path in their
header.
If at least one of the routers of ASi cannot meet the request
(Case Ë), it suggests an amount of bandwidth that could be
offered instead, and adds this suggestion to the packet header.
Although already failed, the request is still forwarded to the
destination (i.e., to the ISD core in case of steady paths)
to collect suggested amounts of bandwidth from subsequent
ASes. This information helps the source make an informed
and direct decision in a potential bandwidth re-negotiation.
As steady paths are only infrequently updated, scalability
and efficiency of steady path updates are of secondary impor-
tance. However, ASi can still perform an efficient admission
decision by simply considering the current utilization of its
directly adjacent AS neighbors. Such an efficient mechanism
is necessary for reservation requests (and renewals) to be
fastpath operations, avoiding to access per-path state. In case
of a positive admission decision, ASi needs to account for the
steady path individually per leaf AS where the reservation
originates from. Only slowpath operations, such as policing
of misbehaving steady paths, need to access this per-path
information about individual steady paths.
Confirmation and usage. When the reservation request
reaches the destination D, the destination replies to the request-
ing source (e.g., S3) either by a confirmation message (Case
Ì in Figure 5) containing the RTs accumulated in the request
packet header, or by a rejection message (Case Í) containing
the suggested bandwidth information collected before.4 As the
confirmation message travels back to the source, every ingress
and egress router accepts the reservation request and switches
the reservation status from temporary to active (Step IV).
In order to use the reserved bandwidth for actual data
traffic, the source includes the RTs in the packet header.
D. Ephemeral paths
Ephemeral paths are used for communication with guaranteed
high bandwidth. Ephemeral paths are short-lived, only valid
on the order of tens of seconds, and thus require continuous
renewals through the life of the connection. The source, the
destination, and any on-path AS can rapidly renegotiate the
allocations. Figure 1 shows two ephemeral paths, one inside
an ISD, one across three ISDs.
We emphasize that the amount of ephemeral bandwidth
that is proportional to steady bandwidth may constitute a lower
bound: If more ephemeral bandwidth is available (for instance
since not everybody might be using his fair share of ephemeral
bandwidth), requesters can choose a bandwidth class above
the proportional ratio. In the spirit of fair allocation of joint
resources, the lifetime of ephemeral paths is limited to 16
seconds in order to curtail the time of resource over-allocation.
The details of the over-allocation, however, are out of scope
and left for future work.
Ephemeral paths from steady paths. Ephemeral path re-
quests bear many similarities with steady path requests, yet
bootstrapping is different: An ephemeral path reservation is
launched by an end host, as opposed to a steady path reser-
vation that is launched by a leaf AS. The end host (e.g., host
S in Figure 1) first obtains a steady up-path starting at its AS
(e.g., ASE ) to the ISD core, and a steady down-path starting at
the destination ISD core (e.g., ASB2) to the destination leaf AS
(e.g., ASH ). Joining these steady paths with an inter-ISD core
path (e.g., from ASA2 to ASB2) results in an end-to-end path
P, which is used to send the ephemeral path request from the
source end host S to the destination end host D using allocated
steady bandwidth.
More specifically, S first generates a new flow ID, chooses
an amount of bandwidth to request from SIBRA’s predefined
ephemeral bandwidth classes, and sends the ephemeral path
request along path P.5 Recall that the path is composed of a
steady up-path of S, a core path, and a steady down-path of
D. The leaf AS where the source end host resides (e.g., ASE )
may decide to block the request in some cases, for instance
if the bandwidth purchased by the leaf AS is insufficient.
Each intermediate AS on path P performs admission control
through a weighted fair sharing mechanism that ensures the
ephemeral bandwidth is directly proportional with its steady
path bandwidth, as described next. The bandwidth reservation
continues similarly to the steady path case.
If bots infest source and destination leaf ASes, these bots
may try to exceed their fair share by requesting, respectively
approving, excessively large amounts of bandwidth. To thwart
5Similarly to the steady path case, although an ephemeral path is identified
by a flow ID, this flow ID is orthogonal to TCP flow IDs. A single ephemeral
path can transport any data packets regardless of their layer-4 protocol.
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this attack, each leaf AS is responsible for splitting its pur-
chased bandwidth among its end hosts according to its local
policy, and for subsequently monitoring the usage.
Efficient weighted bandwidth fair sharing. The intuition
behind SIBRA’s weighted fair sharing for ephemeral band-
width is that purchasing steady bandwidth (or generally spo-
ken: bandwidth for control traffic) on a link L guarantees a
proportional amount of ephemeral bandwidth on L. In Figure 1,
the ephemeral bandwidth on the ephemeral path from end host
S to D is proportional to the steady bandwidth on the steady
up-path from ASE to core ASA2, and also proportional to the
steady bandwidth on the steady down-path from core ASB2
down to ASH . We explain the details of the three cases of intra-
source-ISD links, core links, and intra-destination-ISD links in
the following.
(1) Ephemeral bandwidth in the source ISD. For instance,
a steady up-path of 500 kbps traversing intra-ISD link L guar-
antees 805 ·500 kbps of ephemeral bandwidth on L. Note that
80
5 = 16 is the ratio between ephemeral and steady bandwidth
(Section III-A). Generally speaking, a steady up-path Su with
steady bandwidth sBWu traversing L can request ephemeral
bandwidth of
eBWu = 16 · sBWu (1)
Consequently, an AS that purchases a steady up-path Su
can guarantee its customers a fixed amount of ephemeral
bandwidth for customers’ ephemeral path requests launched
via Su, regardless of the ephemeral path requests from other
ASes on L.
To provide bandwidth guarantees on every link to a desti-
nation, SIBRA extends the influence of the purchased steady
up-path bandwidth along the path to the destination AS. In fact,
SIBRA’s weighted fair sharing for ephemeral bandwidth on
core paths includes the purchased steady up-path bandwidth,
as explained in the following.
(2) Ephemeral bandwidth on core links. Let sBWS be the
total amount of steady bandwidth sold by a core ASS for all
steady paths in ASS’s ISD. Let sBWu be the reserved bandwidth
sold for a particular steady up-path Su in this ISD. Let further
sBWC be the control traffic bandwidth of a core path C between
the core ASes of the steady paths for S and D. Then, ephemeral
reservations on C launched via Su can be up to
eBWuC =
sBWu
sBWS
·16 · sBWC (2)
In other words, the ephemeral bandwidth reservable on C
launched via steady path Su depends not only on the amount
of total ephemeral bandwidth on C, but also on Su’s steady
up-path bandwidth in relation to the total amount of steady
up-path bandwidth purchased in Su’s ISD.
(3) Ephemeral bandwidth in the destination ISD. In the
destination ISD, the weighted fair sharing is slightly more
complex, but follows the ideas of the previous cases: the
weighting includes the steady bandwidth of all steady up-
paths and all steady down-paths, as well as the ratios of the
bandwidth of the core contracts. Before explaining the details,
we note that the reason for including also the steady down-
paths is to give the destination AS control over the minimum
amount of traffic it receives along ephemeral paths.
More precisely, an ephemeral path launched over steady
up-path Su and steady down-path Sd with core path C in
between obtains ephemeral bandwidth
eBWud =
CS→D
C∗→D
· sBWu
sBWS
·16 · sBWd (3)
where CS→D is the bandwidth negotiated in the core contract
for C between the core ASes of S and D, and C∗→D is the total
amount of bandwidth negotiated in all core contracts between
any core AS and D’s core AS.
Equation 3 looks similar to Equation 2, with an additional
factor in the weighting that reflects the ratio of incoming traffic
from other core ASes. Intuitively, this factor assures that traffic
from every other core AS obtains its fair share based on the
bandwidth negotiated in the individual bilateral contracts.
Finally, the overall bandwidth for an ephemeral path be-
tween end hosts S and D launched over steady up-path Su reads
eBWuCd = min(eBWu,eBWuC,eBWud) (4)
These equations compute the guaranteed bandwidth using
the envisioned long-term ratio of 5% steady traffic, 80%
ephemeral traffic, and 15% best-effort traffic. Ideally, the ratio
should be adjustable by each AS, initially with an imbalance in
favor of best-effort during incremental deployment of SIBRA,
until the number of SIBRA subscribers increases. The overall
bandwidth eBWuCd that can be obtained during early deploy-
ment is the minimum of the individual ratios for each AS and
their link bandwidth. We discuss the choice of the ratio in
Section VIII-A and its adaption in terms of an incremental
deployment strategy in Section VI.
Fair sharing of steady paths. A challenging question is
whether a fair sharing mechanism is necessary for steady
bandwidth. A steady up-path is used solely by the AS that
requested it, and its use is monitored by the AS, which
splits the steady up-path bandwidth between its end hosts.
In contrast, steady down-paths need to be revealed to several
potential source ASes, either as private steady down-paths
(e.g., for a company’s internal services), or as public steady
down-paths (e.g., for public services). To prevent a botnet
residing in malicious source ASes from flooding steady down-
paths, SIBRA uses a weighted fair sharing scheme similar to
ephemeral paths: each AS using a steady down-path obtains a
fair share proportional to its steady up-path, and its ISD’s core
path. We give the details of the scheme in Appendix A.
Efficient bandwidth usage via statistical multiplexing. In-
ternet traffic often exhibits a cyclical pattern, with alternating
levels of utilized bandwidth. In situations of low utilization,
fixed allocations of bandwidth for steady and ephemeral paths
that are unused would result in a waste of bandwidth. SIBRA
reduces such bandwidth waste through statistical multiplexing,
i.e., unused steady and ephemeral bandwidth is temporarily
given to best-effort flows. A small slack of unallocated steady
and ephemeral bandwidth still remains to accommodate new
steady and ephemeral bandwidth requests. As more and more
entities demand steady paths and their fair share of ephemeral
paths, SIBRA gradually squeezes best-effort flows and releases
the borrowed steady and ephemeral bandwidth up to the default
allocations.
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Fig. 6: Per-neighbor monitoring may label benign AS1 malicious.
Renewal. End hosts can launch ephemeral path renewals to
increase the reserved bandwidth and extend the expiration
time of the ephemeral path. Since ephemeral reservations
have a short lifetime, they are frequently renewed. Renewals
are launched using the old reservation which contains the
bandwidth class of the reservation; therefore routers can
rapidly decide on the fastpath how much bandwidth they
should allocate for the renewal, for instance if the bandwidth
increased, decreased, or remained the same. Reservations are
given a reservation index, incremented for each renewal of a
specific ephemeral path. Reservations can be renewed anytime
before they expire, and the end host is allowed to switch to
the newer reservation at any time. However, the end host is
not allowed to use both the old and the renewed reservation
at the same time; Section III-F shows a mechanism to detect
such misbehavior.
E. Priority traffic monitoring and policing
Flows that violate their reservations may undermine the guar-
antees of other legitimate flows. An ideal monitoring algorithm
should immediately catch every such malicious flow. This,
however, would be too expensive for line-rate traffic in the
Internet core.
Instead, as the first line of defense, SIBRA relies on edge
ASes to perform fine-grained traffic monitoring. Edge ASes
rely on flow IDs to check each flow’s bandwidth usage and
compare it against the reserved bandwidth for that flow ID,
which is stored by each AS locally during the reservation
request. Previous research has shown that per-flow slowpath
operations are feasible at the edge of the network [37].
Monitoring on transit ASes, however, needs to be processed
on the fastpath. To detect misbehaving ASes that purposely
fail to regulate their own traffic, SIBRA deploys a lightweight
monitoring mechanism in transit ASes. First, each AS monitors
the bandwidth usage of incoming traffic from each neighbor
AS and compares it against the total bandwidth reserved for
that neighbor. Such coarse-grained monitoring timely detects a
misbehaving neighbor that failed to correctly police its traffic.
Why per-neighbor monitoring is insufficient. There are
cases, though, when per-neighbor monitoring in transit ASes is
insufficient. Figure 6 depicts two flows originating in AS0, each
having reserved 5 Mbps. Flow 1 is malicious and sends traffic
with 8 Mbps, while flow 2 underuses its reservation. AS0 hence
does not properly monitor its flows. When AS1 performs per-
neighbor monitoring, it can only notice that, in the aggregate,
it receives 10 Mbps from AS0 and sends 10 Mbps to AS2.
However, when the two flows diverge, AS2 detects flow 1 as
malicious and holds AS1 responsible, although AS1 properly
performed per-neighbor monitoring.
For this reason, SIBRA additionally utilizes fine-grained
probabilistic monitoring of individual flows at the transit ASes,
using a a recently proposed technique [43]. Each transit AS
monitors, per given time interval, all the flows in a number of
randomly chosen bandwidth classes. Recall that the bandwidth
class of a flow is authenticated by the RTs in the packet header.
In case the average bandwidth utilization of a flow during that
time interval exceeds the flow’s bandwidth class, the flow is
classified as malicious and added to a blacklist, preventing its
renewal.
We emphasize that transit ASes perform monitoring on the
fastpath. Only in case of suspicion of misbehavior, these ASes
perform out-of-band slowpath monitoring to police misbehav-
ing neighbors and flows.
To localize the origin AS of the malicious flow, an AS
informs the previous AS of the misbehaving flow. In response,
the previous AS can simply monitor that specific flow ex-
plicitly. If the violation persists, the suspicious previous-hop
neighbor is likely to be malicious. Then, the AS can punish
it, for instance, by terminating their contract.
F. Flow renewal monitoring and policing
A successful ephemeral path renewal replaces the old reserva-
tion, therefore the renewal receives the same flow ID as the
old reservation. However, SIBRA paths allow for RTs with
overlapping validity periods. Therefore, if multiple renewals
occur before the ephemeral path expires, the source would be
in possession of multiple sets of valid RTs: Some correspond-
ing to the ephemeral path with the previous bandwidth class
and old expiration time, and the others corresponding to the
new values for bandwidth class and expiration time, along the
same path. Since all sets of RTs are associated with the same
flow ID, routers would overwrite their per-flow entries with
the new bandwidth class.
A malicious end host could thus exploit renewals by using
both sets of RTs, old and new, during the overlap time of the
RTs, thus using more bandwidth than the amount reserved. To
prevent such misuse, end hosts are not allowed to use old RTs
after having used the renewed RTs. When renewals use the
same bandwidth class as the old reservation, simultaneous use
of old and new RTs is detected by the per-class monitoring
mechanism (as described above) since the usage is jointly
accounted under the same flow ID.
We now consider the case when the renewed bandwidth
class is different from the old one. The edge AS performs per-
flow stateful inspection and is supposed to filter out traffic
that violates the sending rule. Therefore, the edge AS can
be held accountable by other ASes for improperly filtering
traffic. In transit ASes, however, we propose a probabilistic
approach for catching this type of misbehavior. ASes maintain
one Bloom filter [10] per currently active expiration time and
per bandwidth class. Since an RT is maximally valid for 16
seconds and the time granularity is 4 seconds, 4 Bloom filters
are needed per bandwidth class, to record flow IDs that use the
bandwidth class within that time period. We will discuss the
details about time discretization in SIBRA in Section IV-A. For
an incoming packet with a reservation in a monitored class C,
ASes simply store the tuple 〈flow ID,reservation index〉 in the
Bloom filter of class C. By probabilistically inspecting some
of these Bloom filters, each AS notices whether a flow ID uses
two different bandwidth classes during a time period.
We further optimize the monitoring algorithm as follows.
SIBRA selects a small number of classes to monitor at a given
moment in time, therefore ASes store Bloom filters only for
the few monitored traffic classes. In addition, SIBRA does
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not investigate all Bloom filters: We observe that, when the
renewed bandwidth is much higher or much lower than the
previous bandwidth, using both the old and new reservations
would incur an insignificant bandwidth overuse. Therefore, if a
certain reservation index is used in class C, SIBRA investigates
only the Bloom filters of the classes whose bandwidth values
are comparable to C’s bandwidth (the comparability of classes
is discussed in Section IV-A). SIBRA investigates whether in
these Bloom filters an index reservation index+ i is present,
where i∈{0,1, . . . ,15} chosen randomly (i= 0 detects whether
the end host maliciously reuses the same reservation index).
If found, ASes increment a violation counter for the source
of that flow ID. The violation counter allows for Bloom filter
false positives. When the violation counter exceeds a threshold,
an alarm is raised for that sender. Therefore, the more packets
an attacker sends, the higher the probability of detection. The
policing push back technique can then localize the source AS
of the misbehaving flow.
G. Dealing with failures
While bandwidth guarantees along fixed network paths allow
for a scalable design, link failures can still disrupt these paths
and thus render the reservations futile. In fact, leaf ASes
and end hosts are rather interested in obtaining a bandwidth
guarantee than obtaining a specific network path for their
traffic.
SIBRA deals with link failures using two mechanisms:
(1) a failure detection technique to remove reservations along
faulty paths, and (2) a failure tolerance technique to provide
guarantees in the presence of failures. For (1), SIBRA uses
short expiration times for reservations and keep-alive mecha-
nisms. Steady paths expire within 3 minutes of creation, but
leaf ASes can extend the steady paths’ lifetime using keep-
alive messages. Ephemeral paths have a default lifetime of 16
seconds, which can be extended by source end hosts through
renewals. Unless keep-alive messages or renewals are used,
reservations are removed from the system within their default
expiration time. By construction, a new reservation cannot be
created on top of faulty paths. For (2), SIBRA allows leaf ASes
to register multiple disjoint steady paths. We also envision
source end hosts being able to choose a bandwidth reservation
service with high reliability, which would use a small number
of disjoint ephemeral paths to the same destination.
H. Dynamic Interdomain Leased Lines
Businesses use leased lines to achieve highly reliable commu-
nication links. ISPs implement leased lines virtually through
reserved resources on existing networks, or physically through
dedicated network links. Leased lines are very costly, can
require weeks to be set up, and are challenging to establish
across several ISPs.
A natural desire is to achieve properties similar to
traditional leased lines, but more efficiently. GEANT of-
fers a service called “Bandwidth-On-Demand” (BoD), which
is implemented through the InterDomain Controller Proto-
col [1] to perform resource allocations across the participating
providers [14]. Although BoD is a promising step, the alloca-
tions are still heavy-weight and require per-flow state.
With SIBRA’s properties, ISPs can offer lightweight Dy-
namic Interdomain Leased Lines (DILLs). A DILL can be
composed by two longer-lived steady paths, connected through
a core path, or dynamically set up with an ephemeral path that
is constantly renewed. Thanks to the lightweight operation of
SIBRA, DILLs can be set up with an RTT setup message
and are immediately usable. Our discussions with operators of
availability-critical services have shown that the DILL model
has sparked high interest among operators.
To enable long-term DILLs, valid on the order of weeks,
the concept of ephemeral paths in SIBRA could be reframed:
long-term DILLs could use the same techniques for monitoring
and policing as ephemeral paths, however, they would also
introduce new challenges. To enable long-term DILLs, ISPs
need to ensure bandwidth availability even when DILLs are not
actively used, as opposed to ephemeral bandwidth, which can
be temporarily used by best-effort flows. For this purpose, ISPs
could allocate a percentage of their link bandwidth for DILLs,
besides steady, ephemeral, and best-effort paths. Additionally,
for availability in the face of link failures, ISPs would need
to consider active failover mechanisms. For instance, in archi-
tectures that provide path choice, ISPs could leverage disjoint
multipath reservations concentrated in a highly available DILL.
A detailed design though is out of scope for this paper.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We present the implementation of senders and routers to launch
a reservation request and to use a reservation. We rely on
efficient data structures and algorithms that enable fastpath
processing in the common case and explain the infrequent
operations when SIBRA needs slowpath processing.
A. Bandwidth reservation setup
Sender implementation. A reservation request initiator spec-
ifies the following configuration parameters: a flow ID (128
bits), a reservation expiration time (16 bits), bandwidth classes
for forward and/or reverse directions (5 bits each), a path
direction type (2 bits), and a reservation index (4 bits). SIBRA
considers time at a granularity of 4 seconds (which we call
SIBRA seconds). By default, steady paths thus have an initial
lifetime of 45 SIBRA seconds, and ephemeral paths of 4
SIBRA seconds; nevertheless, these paths can be renewed at
any time. All reservations start at the request time.
We chose SIBRA’s bandwidth classes to cover a meaning-
ful range for steady and ephemeral traffic: there are 12 steady
bandwidth classes according to the formula 16 ·
√
2i kbps,
where i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,11}, ranging from 16 kbps to ∼724 kbps;
and 20 ephemeral bandwidth classes according to the for-
mula 256 ·
√
2i kbps, where i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,19}, ranging from
256 kbps to ∼185 Mbps. The exponential growth allows for
a fine-grained allocation of smaller bandwidth values, but
more coarse-grained allocation of larger bandwidth values.
Additionally, it enables efficient monitoring of flow renewals,
with a small number of classes having comparable bandwidth.
The path direction type is a flag that indicates, for a
〈requester,destination〉 pair, either a uni-directional reserva-
tion, for traffic either sent or received by the requester; or
bi-directional, for traffic sent and received by the requester.
The reservation index is a number specific to a flow, incre-
mented every time the reservation corresponding to the flow
is renewed.
Bandwidth reservation and accounting. To efficiently man-
age and account for bandwidth reservations, SIBRA routers
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maintain the following data structures: (1) a bandwidth table,
i.e., an array of size k storing the currently reserved bandwidth
for each of the router’s k neighbors; (2) an accounting table,
i.e., a table with tuples containing the flow ID of a reservation,
the expiration time, the bandwidth class, and the neighbor
to/from whom the reservation is specified; (3) a pending table,
i.e., a table (of similar structure as the accounting table) that
stores pending reservations. A reservation is said to be pending
if it has been requested, but not used for data transmission. A
reservation with flow ID i is said to be active when data has
been transmitted using i, i.e., the router has seen i in a data
packet. A reservation for i is said to be expired if the router
has not seen packets containing i within a time frame of `
SIBRA seconds (details below).
To decide whether a requested amount bwr can be reserved,
routers perform admission control by comparing bwr with the
entry in the bandwidth table for the specified neighbor.6 In
case sufficient bandwidth is available, the request’s flow ID,
the expiration time, the request’s bandwidth class, and the
neighbor are added to the pending table. The requested amount
bwr is also added to the respective entry in the bandwidth table.
Yet, at this point, the router does not add information about the
request to the accounting table. The reason is that the request
may fail at a later point, in which case the accounting table
update would have to be reverted. In a periodic background
process, the router checks whether there are entries in the
pending table older than 300 milliseconds (sufficient to allow
for an Internet round trip time7). Such entries are considered
failed reservations, and thus they are deleted from the pending
table and the corresponding reserved bandwidth is freed and
updated in the bandwidth table.
If the router sees a data packet with flow ID i for the first
time, it implies that the reservation for flow ID i was accepted
by all routers on the path. The reservation becomes active and
the entry with flow ID i is then removed from the pending
table and added to the accounting table.
To periodically reclaim unused ephemeral bandwidth of
expired reservations, a router periodically removes the amount
of expired bandwidth from the bandwidth table. The expiration
parameter ` (e.g., 1≤ `≤ 5) specifies the lifetime (in SIBRA
seconds) of pending reservations. In order to keep reservations
active (even if no data is transmitted), a source simply sends
a keep-alive message within ` SIBRA seconds. In a periodic
background process, the router then iterates over the account-
ing table’s entries that correspond to the last ` SIBRA seconds.
More specifically, the router checks whether the listed flow
IDs occur in a Bloom filter that is filled while forwarding
data packets: to enable fastpath operation, the flow ID of each
incoming data packet is stored in a Bloom filter, not in the
accounting table. Bandwidth reclaim is then processed in the
slowpath.
Intermediate AS implementation. The MAC operation of
RTs are implemented using CBC-MAC based on AES. Our
AES implementation uses AESni [16], a fast instruction set
available on Intel and AMD CPUs, which requires only 4.15
6The reason for considering only the current amount of available band-
width when making the admission decision is justified by the monotonicity of
reservations: reservations can never be set up to start in the future, hence, in
the next SIBRA second, there cannot be less bandwidth available than in the
current SIBRA second (unless new reservations are requested).
7http://www.caida.org/research/performance/rtt/walrus0202
cycles per byte to encrypt a 1 kB buffer in CBC mode. The
key necessary for the MAC operation is expanded once at the
AS and then used for all RTs generated by that AS. SIBRA
uses 32 bits for MACs, which constitutes an optimization, yet
provides sufficient security: a forgery will be detected with
probability 1−2−32.
During a reservation request, the header for the positive ad-
mission of a flow contains the request configuration values set
by the sender and the list of RTs generated so far. A field Hops
is used to locate the correct offset for a newly generated RT.
In addition, a field Extension Flag indicates the request
path type (bi-/uni-directional), the request status (successful or
failed), and whether the packet carries a reservation request or
a reservation confirmation.
When a request does not pass the admission control, then
the corresponding router sets the extension flag to failed, marks
its own AS in the Decline AS* field, and resets Hops to
zero. Starting with this AS, every subsequent AS on the path
towards destination adds a Bandwidth Offer field with the
offered bandwidth.
We implemented SIBRA on top of a SCION-enabled
network, which provides path control. Our SIBRA implemen-
tation provides end-host support through a SIBRA-enabled
gateway, which contains modules for reservation requests and
their confirmation, SCION encapsulation, decapsulation, and a
traffic hijacking module. The last element is implemented via
NetFilter Queue [41], and it allows to tunnel legacy IP traffic
to a remote host through the SIBRA-enabled SCION network.
Such a design provides SIBRA’s benefits to legacy software,
as well as facilitates SIBRA’s deployment.
The SIBRA packet header contains SCION-relevant infor-
mation, such as src/dst addresses, forwarding path as opaque
fields (OFs), the current OF/RT indicator, and an optional
extension field in which SIBRA’s reservation request messages
are encoded. We implemented SIBRA in SCION using exten-
sion headers.
V. EVALUATION
A. Processing on router
We first evaluated SIBRA with respect to the processing
overhead on routers. For our evaluation, we used a traffic
generator that initiated bandwidth reservation requests, and
sent traffic within existing reservations. The traffic generator
was connected to a software router that performed admission
control of the request packets, RT verification, monitoring
for the existent reservations, and then forwarded the packets.
Every experiment was conducted 1 000 times. We considered
routers placed in both edge and core ASes, however processing
time only differed for monitoring operations. All the tests were
conducted on a PC with an Intel Intel Xeon E5-2680 2.7 GHz
and 16 GB of RAM, running Linux (64-bit).
First, we investigated the time required by a router to
process the SIBRA reservation request. The average time to
process a reservation request was 9.1 µs, resulting in about
109 890 that can be processed per second.
Then, we tested the speed of the data packet processing. To
this end, we used our high-performance implementation that
deploys Intel’s DPDK framework8 for networking operations,
8http://dpdk.org/
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and the AESni extension for cryptographic operations. We set
the packet length to 1 500 bytes. We measured the time of
SIBRA processing (i.e., packet parsing and RT verification).
It took 0.040 µs on average to process a single packet, thus
a router is capable to process about 25 million data packets
per second. (Note that these times do not include interactions
with the NIC).
Next, we investigated the performance of monitoring in
the core for two scenarios: 1 and 100 attackers. The average
processing time was 11.24 µs for a single attacker, and 9.91 µs
for 100 attackers. As the results show, the average processing
time decreases with an increasing number of attackers, as
blacklisted flows are processed faster.
B. Bandwidth guarantees under botnet attacks
To show SIBRA’s resilience to Denial of Capability (DoC)
and Coremelt attacks, we run a simulation on an Internet-scale
topology. In our simulation, the attackers attempt to exhaust
the bandwidth of the links common with legitimate flows.
We compare our results with TVA [46], Portcullis [32], and
STRIDE [19], obtained using the same configuration.
Method. Our Internet-scale topology is based on a CAIDA
dataset [2] that contains 49 752 ASes and the links among
them as observed from today’s Internet. Based on these con-
nections, we grouped the ASes into five ISDs, representing five
continent-based regions. For our simulation we chose the two
biggest ISDs: ISD1 containing 21 619, and ISD2 containing
6 039 ASes. The core of each ISD is formed by Tier-1 ISPs.
We set the capacity of the core link between ISD1 and ISD2 to
40 Gbps. Inside each ISD, we set the capacity of core links to
10 Gbps, the capacity of links between a core AS and a Tier-2
AS to 2.4 Gbps, and all other links to 640 Mbps. Steady paths
and core paths were established before the experiment.
In both attack scenarios, the attackers (compromised hosts)
are distributed uniformly at random in different ASes. Le-
gitimate sources reside in two ASes (i.e., each AS contains
100 legitimate sources). We further use the same parameters
as the related work: a 5% rate limit for reservation requests,
and request packets of 125 bytes. All the sources (including
attackers) send 10 requests per second. According to Mirkovic
et al. [27], we set 4 seconds as the request timeout.
DoC Attack. We simulate both intra-ISD and inter-ISD DoC
attacks. For the intra-ISD case, source and destination ASes
are within ISD2, and ISD2 contains 1 000 contaminated ASes.
All the requests, from benign and malicious ASes, traverse the
same link in the core. In the inter-ISD scenario, the source
resides in ISD1 and the destination resides in ISD2, there
are 500 contaminated ASes in each ISD, and all the requests
traverse the same links in the core.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show the fraction of successfully
delivered capability requests (success ratio) correlated to the
number of active attackers. For both cases (intra- and inter-ISD
DoC attacks), TVA and Portcullis perform similarly: on core
links, legitimate requests mingle with malicious ones. After-
wards, since the link bandwidth decreases after traversing the
core, there is a rapid increase in the request packets’ queueing
time. Consequently, the success ratio decreases. TVA’s success
ratio stabilizes around 40%. Portcullis uses computational
puzzles, and the request packets with a higher computational
level are forwarded first. Hence, when more attackers with
optimal strategy [32] appear, the time to compute a puzzle
increases accordingly, leading to a decrease of the success
ratio to 0 when the computation time exceeds 4 seconds. In
STRIDE, the ISD core has no protection, but traffic inside
ISD2 has a higher priority than traffic coming from ISD1.
Thus, during the intra-ISD attack, STRIDE’s success ratio
stays 100% until the core becomes congested. However, in the
inter-ISD case, STRIDE’s performance declines dramatically,
since a majority of requests from ISD1 are dropped if any
core link in ISD2 is congested. SIBRA successfully delivers
all the legitimate requests, in both attack scenarios, because
SIBRA requests are launched using steady paths, and steady
paths guarantee a fair share of control traffic along core paths.
Coremelt Attack. We simulate a Coremelt attack with the
following settings: ISD2 contains 500 pairs of contaminated
ASes (selected uniformly at random), which communicate
using ephemeral paths, each with a throughput of 8 kbps of
their 256 kbps reservations. The source and the destination also
communicate using an ephemeral path, of 800 kbps. All the
ephemeral paths in the experiment traverse the same core link.
We measure the bandwidth obtained when the source sends to
the destination a 1 MB file.
Figure 7(c) shows that the congestion on the core link
degrades the file transfer time in STRIDE to over 100 seconds.
TVA, which uses per-destination queues to forward authorized
traffic, performs slightly worse than Portcullis, simulated using
per-source weighted fair sharing based on the computational
level. SIBRA outperforms the other schemes, because it gives
a lower bound on the bandwidth obtained for the file transfer,
due to its weighted fair sharing based on the steady paths.
C. Lower bound on bandwidth fair share
We simulate the bandwidth obtained by new ephemeral paths
when requests for ephemeral paths arrive from both benign
and malicious sources. We considered a scenario where all
the requests are forwarded using the same steady down-path
(SIBRA’s worst case for weighted fair sharing).
The legitimate steady up-path from the source AS carried
5 requests per second, and has a bandwidth of 362 kbps.
There were approximately 50 attackers on every malicious
up-path, and each attacker sent one request per second. The
attackers’ steady up-path bandwidth was randomly selected
from our steady bandwidth classes (16 kbps to 724 kbps).
The bandwidth requested for ephemeral paths ranged from
256 kbps up to 11.6 Mbps.
The result for this setting is presented in Figure 8(a).
The green line shows the real-time reservable bandwidth, that
changes dynamically but finally stabilizes around 2.5 Mbps.
At time interval 100, the number of attackers and steady up-
paths used for requesting ephemeral paths increases. However,
SIBRA guarantees that reservable bandwidth remains stable
despite the increasing numbers of attackers. This is due to the
fair share, which is not affected by the number of attackers
with steady paths.
D. Reservation request loss tolerance
Next, we simulate the influence of packet loss on epheme-
ral bandwidth reservation. We assume that at every second
there are 1 000 reservation requests sent, with the following
parameters: variable path length (5–10), random bandwidth
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Fig. 7: Comparative simulation results for TVA, Portcullis, STRIDE, and SIBRA against Intra-ISD DoC attack 7(a), Inter-ISD DoC attack 7(b)
and Coremelt attack 7(c).
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Fig. 8: Simulation results on SIBRA’s availability. (a) shows the
existence of the reservable bound for bandwidth requests. Note
that the bandwidth (green line) in the figure is multiplied by 20
for improved readability. (b) presents the resilience of bandwidth
reservation against packet loss.
(50 kbps – 6.4 Mbps), variable packet loss rate (0–10%), and
RTT set to 1 second. Similar to Portcullis [32] and TVA [46],
we assume that request packets are limited to 5% of the entire
link capacity.
In our simulation, we consider packet loss for both reserva-
tion request and reply packets. This setting introduced unused
bandwidth reservation on the routers that had already pro-
cessed the packet, until bandwidth reclaim occurs. We express
the bandwidth waste rate rwaste as unused reserved bandwidth
divided by the sum of reserved bandwidth.
As shown in Figure 8(b), even at a loss rate of 5%, the
corresponding rwaste is no more than 1.4%. Moreover, the
diagram indicates that rwaste increases linearly when the loss
rate rises, which shows that SIBRA tolerates packet loss well,
thus providing robust bandwidth reservation.
VI. INCREMENTAL DEPLOYMENT
Within a single ISP network, deployment of SIBRA does not
require major changes in the underlying infrastructure since
the ISP can utilize its existing core network with protocol-
independent transport like MPLS. The ISP can thus build
a “SIBRA-ready” network by adding new customer/provider
edge routers and setting up MPLS tunnels with reserved
bandwidth among them to traverse the traditional network fab-
ric. A global-scale inter-ISP deployment is more challenging,
because a simple overlay approach with IP-tunneling would
not provide the contiguous bandwidth reservation required
for SIBRA. To take full advantage of SIBRA, ISPs need
direct links to interconnect their SIBRA routers. Therefore,
in its initial deployment phase, we envision a SIBRA network
operated by a small group of ISPs with mutual connectivity.
An essential question is whether such a partially-deployed
new network infrastructure provides immediate financial bene-
fits for early adopters, and subsequently attracts new ISPs. The
business example of the startup company Aryaka is similar
to SIBRA regarding the deployment purposes. Aryaka has
successfully established a private core network infrastructure,
dedicated to optimize WAN traffic between Aryaka’s Points
of Presence (POPs) across the world. These POPs deploy
Aryaka’s proprietary WAN optimization protocols, and enter-
prise customers’ distributed business sites located near POPs
benefit from application acceleration. By offering a global
network solution, Aryaka gained the interest of regional ISPs
that want to provide WAN optimization beyond their own re-
gions. Aryaka is continuously expanding its edge infrastructure
through Tier-3 and Tier-4 ISPs. Yet, as opposed to SIBRA, by
using a private core network, Aryaka’s solution comes at a
high cost, and may be even more costly to scale to all ASes
in the Internet.
Similar to the case of Aryaka, we expect SIBRA’s deploy-
ment to begin at the core, between a few Tier-1 ISPs that
seek to provide DILLs spanning their joint regions. These
early adopters may quickly monetize the SIBRA bandwidth
reservation service by selling DILLs to their direct customers.
Gradually, the SIBRA network would expand through new
ISP collaborators interested in providing bandwidth reservation
beyond their own regions. ISPs have the incentive to support
SIBRA, as they can draw traffic towards them, and also appeal
to both existing and new clients who desire effective DDoS
protection, thus increasing the ISPs’ revenues.
During the expansion of SIBRA, ISPs are likely to start
SIBRA deployment with lower ratios for steady and ephemeral
bandwidth, suitable for the needs of a small number of initial
SIBRA customers. Meanwhile, best-effort customers still enjoy
a throughput similar to that before SIBRA deployment. As the
number of SIBRA subscribers increases, ISPs could locally
adjust the ratios towards an increased steady and ephemeral
proportion, and persuade their providers to follow, as well
as adjust their core contracts accordingly. As more and more
customers shift from best-effort to SIBRA, best-effort traffic
obtains a smaller ratio. Depending on their customer segmen-
tation, ISPs could either adjust best-effort subscriptions to the
new network traffic, or increase their link capacity.
We evaluated a potential deployment plan for SIBRA
using the AS topology from CAIDA9 in the following setting.
9http://www.caida.org/data/as-relationships/
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Fig. 9: Deploying ISPs (dark colors) gain revenue from all their
neighbors (medium colors) potentially buying guaranteed bandwidth.
The deploying region extends through neighbors (patterned area),
with their direct neighbors as potential buyers (bold outline).
We considered a set of initial adopters, tier-1 ISPs selected
uniformly at random. Potential adopters in the next deployment
round are the neighbors of the deploying nodes, as depicted
in Figure 9, such that there is always a contiguous region
of deploying ASes. We consider rational potential adopters,
which deploy SIBRA only if they can monetize the guaranteed-
bandwidth service by selling it to their neighbors. Such neigh-
bors would buy the service if the traffic they originate can
use DILLs up to their destinations. Thus, we compare the
traffic originating at a buyer neighbor AS that can use DILLs,
compared to the total amount of traffic originating at the
same neighbor AS. Since traffic information between ASes is
usually confidential, we approximate the traffic using a model
introduced by Chan et al. [11]: the traffic between a source and
a destination AS is represented by the product of the ASes’
IP spaces. We obtained the data on the AS-IP-space mapping
from CAIDA10.
When the set of initial deployers consists of three ASes,
next round adopters could monetize SIBRA on a percentage
of traffic between 40% – 48%. Four initial adopters lead to
potential SIBRA traffic of 47% – 49%, and five initial adopters
to 50% – 52%. We conclude that deployment starting at the
Internet core greatly leverages the incremental deployment of
SIBRA.
VII. USE CASES
With the flexible lifetime of DILLs, ranging from tens of sec-
onds to weeks on-demand, SIBRA brings immediate benefits
to applications where guaranteed availability matters. These
applications comprise critical infrastructures, such as financial
services and smart electric grids, as well as business applica-
tions, such as videoconferencing and reliable data sharing in
health care. As discussed above, setting up leased lines in these
cases may take several weeks and may become prohibitively
expensive: it is costly to install leased lines between each pair
of domains, and also to connect each domain through a leased
line to a central location in order to build up a star topology.
Critical infrastructures. Financial services, for instance
transaction processing from payment terminals, would become
more reliable when using SIBRA DILLs: since DILLs guar-
antee availability even in the presence of adversarial traffic,
payment requests and their confirmations would always obtain
a guaranteed minimum bandwidth. DILLs could also be used
for remote monitoring of power grids: a minimum guaran-
teed bandwidth would be suitable to deliver the monitored
parameters, independent of malicious hosts exchanging traffic.
10http://data.caida.org/datasets/routing/routeviews-prefix2as/
Telemedicine is another use case of practical relevance: the
technology uses telecommunication to provide remote health
care — often in critical cases or emergency situations where
interruptions could have fatal consequences.
Business-critical applications. Videoconferencing between
the remote sites of a company receives increasing importance
as a convenient way to foster collaborations while reducing
travel costs. Short-lived and easily installable DILLs provide
the necessary guaranteed on-demand bandwidth for reliably
exchanging video traffic. Another application is reliable on-
demand sharing of biomedical data for big-data processing,
complementing the efforts of improving health care quality and
cost in initiatives such as Big Data to Knowledge launched by
the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) [26].
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. On the choice of bandwidth proportions for SIBRA links
Recall that in Section III-A, we assigned 80%, 15%, and 5%
of a link’s bandwidth to ephemeral, best-effort, and steady
paths, respectively. This parameter choice is justified through
an analysis of today’s actual Internet traffic.
• First to notice is that the majority of traffic constitutes
persistent high-bandwidth connections: for example in
Australia, we see that Netflix’s video connections con-
tribute to more than 50% of the entire Internet traffic
[3]. Given an additional amount of traffic from other
large video providers such as Youtube and Facebook, we
estimate ephemeral paths to require roughly 70–90% of
a link’s bandwidth.
• Best-effort is still important for some types of low-
bandwidth connections: email, news, and SSH traffic
could continue as best-effort traffic, totaling 3.69% of
the Internet traffic [22]; similar the case for DNS traffic
totaling 0.17% of the Internet traffic [22]. In addition,
very short-lived flows (that is flows with a lifetime less
than 256 ms) with very few packets (the median flow
contains 37 packets [39]) are unlikely to establish SIBRA
reservations, simply to avoid the round-trip time of the
reservation setup. Such flows sum up to 5.6% of the
Internet traffic [39] and can thus also be categorized under
best-effort.
• Finally, regarding the amount of bandwidth for steady
paths and connection-establishment traffic, we conducted
an experiment using the inter-AS traffic summary by a
DDoS detection system at one of the largest tier-1 ISPs.
With a 10-day recording of this data, we found that only
0.5% of the 1.724×1013 packets were connection estab-
lishment packets. To enable communication guarantees
for low-bandwidth traffic, including bandwidth reserva-
tion request packets, we designed SIBRA to allocate ten-
fold of the amount measured.
Since it is hard to specify the actual bandwidth proportions
precisely, we use 80%, 15%, and 5% as initial values and note
that these values can be re-adjusted at any point in the future.
We recall from Section III-D that, in addition to the
parameter choice, SIBRA’s statistical multiplexing between
the traffic classes helps to dynamically balance the traffic.
We expect that in particular the long-lived reservations are not
always fully utilized, in which case best-effort traffic can be
transmitted instead.
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Fig. 10: The number of active flows every second and their through-
put, observed on a 10 Gbps Internet core link.
B. Per-flow stateless operations are necessary
To understand the amount of per-flow storage state required
on the fastpath, we investigate the number of active flows per
second as seen by a core router in today’s Internet. We used
anonymized one-hour Internet traces from CAIDA, collected
in July 2014. The traces contain all the packets that traversed
a 10 Gbps Internet core link of a Tier-1 ISP in the United
States, between San Jose and Los Angeles.
Figure 10 depicts our findings as the number of active
flows on the core link at a granularity of one second, for a
total duration of 412 seconds. We observe that the number
of flows varies around 220 000, with a boundary effect at the
beginning of the data set. These flows sum into a throughput
between 3 and 4 Gbps — a link load of 30% to 40%. A
large core router switching 1 Tbps (with 100 such 10 Gbps
links) would thus observe 22×106 flows per second in the
normal case, considering a link load of only 40%. In an attack
case, adversaries could greatly inflate the number of flows
by launching connections between bots, as in Coremelt [38].
Schuchard et al. already analyzed attacks that can exhaust the
router memory [34]. All these results suggest storing per-flow
state in the fastpath, on the line card, becomes prohibitively
expensive, even more so when the core link load increases.
C. Case study: achievable ephemeral bandwidth on core links
A central point of SIBRA is to guarantee a sufficient amount
of bandwidth using today’s infrastructure, even for reservations
that span multiple ISDs. A central question is how much
bandwidth an end-domain could minimally obtain if globally
all domains attempt to obtain their maximum fair share. To
investigate this point, we considered a scenario with Australia
as destination, and all non-Australian leaf ASes in the world
reserving ephemeral bandwidth to Australia. We picked Aus-
tralia because with its 24 million inhabitants, it represents
a major economy, and it already experienced infrastructure
congestion in today’s Internet [3]. While its geographical
location hinders laying new cables, Australia is well-suited for
our study aiming to determine a lower bound on the amount
of bandwidth SIBRA core links can expect. Other countries,
especially those situated on larger continents, typically feature
higher-bandwidth connectivity, as laying cables on land is
easier than in the ocean.
Figure 11 illustrates the current submarine link map of
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Fig. 11: Australia submarine link map, including link capacities.
Australia, including the name and capacity of the links.11 The
entire traffic traverses these links. For simplicity, we assume
guaranteed bandwidth is split equally between leaf ASes. In
practice, however, the bandwidth is proportional to the size of
the steady paths of the leaf ASes (Section III). We considered
two cases: (i) the worst case, i.e., when all reservations are
squeezed over the same link — in our case, we chose the
highest-bandwidth cable, namely the Australia-Japan Cable
(6 Tbps), and (ii) the best case, i.e., when the reservations
are distributed across all cables (totaling 15.04 Tbps). In con-
trast to other architectures, SIBRA’s underlying architecture,
SCION, enables the use of multi-path communication for the
traffic between a source and a destination, along several core
links.
We have determined the number of leaf ASes in the world,
using the AS topology from CAIDA9, and counted 32 428 non-
Australian leaf ASes using the AS number and location12.
After the analysis, we found that each non-Australian leaf
AS obtains a fair share of (i) 185.02 Mbps (148 Mbps for
ephemeral traffic), or (ii) 463.86 Mbps (371.08 Mbps for
ephemeral traffic). We thus conclude that SIBRA’s fair sharing
scheme offers a substantial amount of bandwidth through an
efficient use of the current Internet infrastructure. In case
this amount is insufficient, an AS could purchase additional
bandwidth for a specific destination from its core AS.
The prospects are even brighter: considering the planned
undersea physical infrastructure development, the capacity of
the cables connecting Australia with the rest of the world
would increase by 168 Tbps by the beginning of 2018. With
such an increase, the fair share on SIBRA’s core links becomes
5.64 Gbps per leaf AS in case (ii).
IX. RELATED WORK
Capability-based mechanisms [7, 19, 24, 30, 32, 44, 46]
aim at isolating legitimate flows from malicious DDoS attack
traffic. Network capabilities are access tokens issued by on-
path entities (e.g., routers and destination) to the source.
Only packets carrying such network capabilities are allowed
to use a privileged channel. Capability-based schemes, how-
ever, require additional defense mechanisms against Denial
11http://www.submarinecablemap.com/ illustrates the submarine link map.
The link capacities were obtained from various resources, e.g., the Australia-
Japan Cable capacity from http://www.ajcable.com/company-history/.
12http://data.caida.org/datasets/as-organizations/
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of Capability attacks [8] and against attacks with colluding
hosts or legitimate-looking bots [21, 38]. To address DoC
attacks, TVA [46] tags each packet with a path identifier
which is based on the ingress interface of the traversing
ASes. The path identifier is used to perform fair queueing of
the request packets at the routers. However, sources residing
further away from the congested link will suffer a significant
disadvantage. Portcullis [32] deploys computational puzzles
to provide per-computation fair sharing of the request chan-
nel. Such proof-of-work schemes, however, are too expensive
to protect every data packet. Moreover, Portcullis does not
provide the property of botnet-size independence. Floc [24]
fair-shares link bandwidth of individual flows and differentiates
between legitimate and attack flows for a given link. However,
such coarse-grained per-AS fair sharing may not always be
effective; in particular, low-rate attack flows can often not be
precisely differentiated. CoDef [25] is a collaborative defense
mechanism in which a congested AS asks the source ASes
to limit their bandwidth to a specific upper bound and to
use a specific path. Source ASes that continue sending flows
that exceed their requested quota are classified as malicious.
CoDef does not prevent congestion in the first place, but
instead retroactively handles one congested link at a time.
Since congestion can still occur on links, sources cannot be
given a guarantee for reaching a destination. STRIDE [19]
is a capability-based DDoS protection architecture that builds
on several concepts from SCION [9, 48]. Although STRIDE
shares similarities with SIBRA (steady paths and ephemeral
paths), STRIDE lacks intra-core and inter-ISD communication
guarantees; STRIDE’s intra-domain guarantees are built on
the assumption of congestion-free core networks. Moreover,
STRIDE lacks monitoring and policing mechanisms, as well
as an implementation.
Resource allocation. Several queuing protocols [31, 35, 37]
have been proposed to approximate fair bandwidth allocation
at routers. Their correctness, however, relies on the trustwor-
thiness of the routers and flow identifiers. The Path Computa-
tion Element (PCE) architecture [13, 40] computes inter-AS
routes and enables resource allocation across AS boundaries in
Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) Traffic
Engineered networks. However, the discovery of inter-AS PCE
path fragments discloses information about other cooperating
AS, such as the internal topology. Some ASes will be reluctant
to share this information due to confidentiality reasons.
Resource reservation. RSVP [47] is a signaling protocol for
bandwidth reservation. Because RSVP is not designed with
security in mind, the reservation may fail due to DDoS attacks.
RSVP requires the sender (e.g., a host or an AS when RSVP
aggregation is used as specified in RFC 3175) to make an
end-to-end reservation to the receiver(s), causing a quadratic
number of control messages (in the number of entities) in the
network and quadratic state on the intermediate routers.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Through hierarchical decomposition of resource reservations,
SIBRA is the first scalable architecture that provides inter-
domain bandwidth guarantees — achieving botnet-size inde-
pendence and resolving even sophisticated DDoS attacks such
as Coremelt [38] and Crossfire [21]. SIBRA ends the arms
race between DDoS attackers and defenders, as it provides
guaranteed resource reservations regardless of the attacker’s
botnet size. A salient property of SIBRA is that it can be built
without requiring per-flow state in the fastpath of a router,
resulting in a simple router design and high-speed packet
processing. We anticipate that SIBRA becomes a game changer
in the battle against large-scale DDoS attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Fair sharing of steady down-paths
Recall from Section III-B that core ASes negotiate core
contracts to set up core paths among each other (the double
continuous lines in Figure 1). The reserved bandwidth for those
core paths is negotiated based on aggregated traffic volumes as
observed in the past. The question we consider in the following
is how the reserved bandwidth is split among the customers
of the core ASes. More precisely, we describe a sharing
mechanism that assigns each leaf AS E a fair amount of
bandwidth for E’s traffic traversing the core paths. Intuitively,
fair in this context means proportional to the amount of
bandwidth that E has purchased for its steady up-paths to
the core AS. In contrast to the fair sharing mechanism for
ephemeral paths (Section III-D), the equations we introduce
here do not require the additional weighting factor 16 = 805
given by the ratio of ephemeral and steady bandwidth.
Steady bandwidth on core links. The steady bandwidth of
a core path C = 〈ASC1, . . . ,ASCn〉 between core ASC1 and a
destination core ASCn is split between all customer ASes of
ASC1, weighted with the bandwidth of the steady up-path each
customer AS uses.
Let sBWu∗ be the total amount of steady bandwidth sold by
a core ASC1 for all its steady paths. Let sBWu be the reserved
bandwidth sold by ASC1 for a particular steady up-path Su. Let
further sBWC be the steady bandwidth of core path C. Then
the steady traffic on C launched via Su can be up to:
sBWuC =
sBWu
sBWu∗
· sBWC (5)
Steady bandwidth in the destination ISD. In the destination
ISD, the weighted fair sharing follows the same intuition,
this time consisting first of a fair sharing mechanism between
different ISDs, then between the ASes in the same ISD.
More precisely, steady traffic launched over steady up-path
Su and steady down-path Sd , with core path C in between,
obtains a throughput:
sBWuCd =
CC1→Cn
C∗→Cn
· sBWu
sBWu∗
· sBWd (6)
where CC1→Cn is the bandwidth negotiated in C’s core contract
between core ASC1 (source ISD) and core ASCn (destination
ISD), C∗→Cn is the total amount of bandwidth negotiated in
the core contracts between any core AS and the destination
ISD’s core ASCn, and sBWd is the reserved bandwidth sold by
core ASCn for steady down-path d.
The second case is that of local steady traffic in the
destination ISD, which does not traverse any core path. In
fact, this happens only when the steady up- and down-paths
cross at the same core AS, otherwise traffic would traverse a
core path between the core ASes of the destination ISD (see
Figure 1).
This case introduces a preference ρ ∈ (0,1) that splits
the bandwidth of the steady down-path between traffic that
traverses core paths, and traffic that does not.
Let sBWu∗ be the total bandwidth of all steady up-paths
to a given core AS in the destination ISD. Then, a particular
steady up-path among them, say with bandwidth sBWu, obtains
steady bandwidth on the down-path d of
sBW ρud =
sBWu
sBWu∗
·ρ · sBWd (7)
Traffic from external ISDs is weighted accordingly, extend-
ing Equation 6:
sBW ρuCd = (1−ρ) · sBWuCd (8)
Authentication of bandwidth values. To compute sBWuC and
sBWuCd , ASes use the bandwidth values for steady up-paths
and core paths included in the SIBRA packet headers. In order
to prevent a malicious AS from increasing its fair share by
tampering with the bandwidth values, SIBRA requires the core
ASes of each ISD to sign the bandwidth of steady up-paths
inside the ISD, as well as the bandwidth of core paths starting
at the ISD core.
Signing can take place when the steady paths are registered
at the ISD core. Each AS first verifies the signatures, and
then computes the fair shares. Fast signing and verification
can be implemented using the public-key high-speed signature
scheme ed25519. The private key used for signing by an
ISD core can be shared among the core ASes in each ISD.
For signature verification, the corresponding public key of an
ISD core is distributed to all other ISDs, which disseminate
the key to all ASes inside the ISD. In practice, on the order of
only 100 public keys need to be distributed. Since ISD cores
are typically stable, key change and re-distribution should be
infrequent. A detailed description is out of scope for this paper.
Dynamic fair sharing. A pertinent question is whether the
computed fair share is large enough to be useful. On core
links, whose capacity exceeds hundreds of Gbps (recall the
example of Australia in Section VIII), even a ratio of only 1%
steady bandwidth is on the order of a few Gbps, which would
give each AS outside Australia tens of Mbps of steady traffic.
However, in the destination ISD, given that steady down-
paths’ capacity is merely a few Mbps of bandwidth, the fair
share obtained for each leaf AS is less than 1 kbps — too
small to be useful. Of course, a popular destination AS could
register several steady down-paths to increase the steady fair
share, but the increase factor is still small compared to the
number of possible source ASes.
The key observation is that SIBRA enforces the fair share
on steady traffic dynamically, i.e., only when a steady down-
path becomes congested. The fair share is computed between
the ASes that actively use the steady down-path, as opposed
to all possible ASes in the Internet. The fair share is reserved
for 1 second, which allows the AS two retry attempts if an
ephemeral reservation fails (considering an RTT of 300 ms –
a conservative value, according to measurements performed by
CAIDA13).
13https://www.caida.org/research/performance/rtt/walrus0202/
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